The 4th Down Gamble – Think Twice

Pure statistics say that a team’s success rate to convert a 4th down to a 1st down or a score is about 50% when that 4th down is for short yardage. However, NFL teams “go for it” only about 20% of the time. A few coaches such as Bill Belichick and Jack Del Rio have developed a “reputation” as mavericks who toss caution to the wind and take the chance on 4th down more often than their coaching colleagues. While these coaches may opt to keep their punting teams off the field more frequently, their decision to go on 4th down is still below 50 percent. Why?

Well, PossessionPoints.com loves stats, and in fact, our business was built on the premise that our in-game stat can help a coach evaluate when it is a good time to take that 50-50 risk. But we are not in the same camp as some of the other stat analysts who think coaches should be going for it on 4th down more often. Stats can help determine when it is a good time to take a chance, but stats do not capture the major emotional factor in football that occurs when two teams are on the line trying to prevent or achieve that all important and possibly game-turning 1st down play.

When a team “goes for it” on 4th down, play-by-play announcers usually offer comments such as “The coach is showing great confidence in his Offense keeping them out there to pick up those one or two yards.” That may be a true analysis, but anyone who has ever played a competitive sport knows that it is the Defense who makes or breaks these momentous plays. When a coach keeps the Offense out on the field, he is sending a clear message to the opposing Defense that says, “We do not respect your ability to stop us.” Some Defenses may take this stance as a challenge; others see it as an insult. Either way, a Defense is going to be fired up with adrenaline pumping, and they will do whatever it takes to stop a 4th down conversion especially if that conversion will result in a touchdown.

Let us examine some recent games where a 4th down conversion came into play. In this season’s Minnesota – Chicago game in week 13, the Bears held a 7-3 lead in the first half and were down on the Minnesota goal line. The Bears had 3rd and goal at the one-yard line but were unsuccessful at getting in the end zone. On 4th and 1, Coach Lovie Smith had two options at his disposal. He could have kicked a field goal (a distance shorter than an extra point where the success rate this year has exceeded 99%) to take a 7 point lead or go for the touchdown and an 11 point lead. A logical person might have argued “What is the worst scenario that could happen in this situation?” The answer: the Bears fail in their attempt to score the touchdown, and the Vikings get the ball in the worst possible field position for them at their own one-yard line. Well, Smith chose to forego the three almost certain points and opt for a touchdown play. Unfortunately, for Chicago, the Vikings’ pride did not share his enthusiasm for a touchdown. Instead, they showed off some of their own talent and stopped the Bears in their tracks.

Okay, how bad could this be? The Bears surmised they would return the Defensive favor and possibly force the Vikings into a Safety and take the two points. After all, that is almost a field goal – right?
With this somewhat dire situation facing the Vikings’ Offense, most coaches might have decided to put in their short yardage Offense and try to move the ball off the goal line into calmer waters. However, the Vikings decided to let their Offense feed off the adrenaline rush of their Defense and instead called for a deep sideline pass. The Receiver managed to get behind the Defender, and lo and behold caught the Quarterback’s pass and sprinted for a 99-yard touchdown. Suddenly, in two plays, the game went from what could have been a certain Bears 10-3 lead to a Vikings 10-7 lead. The Vikings never looked back and went on to trounce the Bears 34-14.

This same week, the Jags found themselves behind in a game and their prospects looked bleak. Jacksonville tried not once, but twice on the same drive, to convert a 4th down. It was early in the 4th quarter, and the Jags were down 16-3, so the time seemed right to gamble. The Jags pushed their luck and succeeded in their first attempt which was at the Texans’ 33-yard line, a plausible field goal distance. They gave up three points, but they had a chance to move the ball further toward a seven-point score. However, that 1st down victory was short lived at best. Within seconds, the Jags found themselves in the same 50-50, 4th down scenario on the Texans’ five-yard line. Now, here the Jags have a situation where you have thrown down the gauntlet to your opponents and came out the victor once. When they threw down that gauntlet a second time, The Texans’ pride charged forward, and this emotional surge paid off. Jacksonville failed to convert the second 4th down again which was at a field position that was a virtual certainty for a field goal. Would a field goal have changed the fate of the Jaguars? Who knows? But a field goal might have taken the wind out of the sails of the Texans and made this game closer.

Next time you are watching a game and you want a coach to just “Go For It” and forego his “over conservative” approach, think of these two situations. PossessionPoints.com absolutely concurs that sometimes a coach does “need to” go for it on 4th down. The original PossessionPoints stat was founded as a tool to help coaches make that 4th and short decision. It came into existence because of a late game 4th down punt decision where the team that punted (the Eagles in the 2006 playoff game against the Saints) never got the ball back and lost the game. That was a “need to” situation. In general, we would say taking the risk on 4th down should be more along the lines of the traditional approach have long practiced: take the chance only when absolutely necessary.